In 2004 and 2005, long-term interest rates remained remarkably low despite improving economic conditions and rising short-term interest rates, a situation that former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan dubbed a "conundrum."We document the extent and timing of this conundrum using two empirical no-arbitrage macro-…nance models of the term structure of interest rates. These models con…rm that the recent behavior of longterm yields has been unusual-that is, it cannot be explained within the framework of the models. Therefore, we consider other macroeconomic factors omitted from the models and …nd that some of these variables, particularly declines in long-term bond volatility, may explain a portion of the conundrum. Foreign o¢ cial purchases of U.S Treasuries appear to have played little or no role.
[L]ong-term interest rates have trended lower in recent months even as the Federal Reserve has raised the level of the target federal funds rate by 150 basis points. This development contrasts with most experience, which suggests that, other things being equal, increasing shortterm interest rates are normally accompanied by a rise in longer-term yields... For the moment, the broadly unanticipated behavior of world bond markets remains a conundrum.
-Testimony of Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan to U.S. Senate, February 16, 2005 1 Introduction
As a broad empirical regularity, long-term interest rates tend to move month-by-month in the same direction as short-term rates, although by a lesser amount. In the Unted States, the simple correlation since 1984 between changes in short-term and long-term rates implies that percent to 4.5 percent over that same period. 1 This directional divergence between U.S.
short and long rates appears even more unusual given other pressures at the time, such as a robust economic expansion, rising energy prices, and a deteriorating federal …scal situation, all of which have tended to boost long-term interest rates in the past. In this paper, we investigate the seemingly odd behavior of long-term interest rates over this recent episode, a development which former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan has labeled a "conundrum." 2 Determining whether recent long-term interest rate movements truly represent a conundrumas opposed to simply an extension of secular declines in long-term interest rates that have been taking place over the past 20 years-requires a rigorous theoretical framework that can take into account the important factors that a¤ect long-term rates. Our choice of a theoretical framework for this examination is guided by much recent research that suggests that a joint macro-…nance modeling strategy provides the most comprehensive explanation of movements in long-term rates. 3 From a macroeconomic perspective, the short-term interest rate is a policy instrument under the direct control of the central bank, which adjusts that rate to achieve its economic stabilization goals. Therefore, …nancial market participants'understanding of central bank behavior will be an important element in the formation of their expectations of future short-term interest rates, which, in turn, will be a key component for the pricing of longer-term bonds. To illustrate this point, it is useful to contrast the recent behavior of U.S. interest rates to their behavior during the previous episode of extended monetary tightening, which occurred a decade earlier. Speci…cally, from January 1994 to February 1995, as the Federal Reserve raised the short-term federal funds rate by 3 percentage points, the 10-year rate also rose by 1.7 percentage points. This reaction was somewhat greater than the average response, and a common interpretation of this episode is that bond investors were especially worried that in ‡ation pressures might not be counteracted by the A …nance perspective, which stresses the importance of changing investor perceptions of risk for bond pricing, is also likely to be a crucial element in assessing whether there is any bond rate conundrum. Indeed, many have suggested that a reduction in the risk premium is responsible for recent low levels of bond rates. Such a reduction may be attributable to changes in the amount of risk or to changes in the pricing of that risk, and numerous 3 The connection between the macroeconomic and …nance views of the term structure has been a very fertile area for recent research including, among many others, Ang and Piazzesi (2003) , Wu (2001) , Dewachter and Lyrio (2006) , Evans and Marshall (2001) , Diebold, Rudebusch, and Aruoba (2006), Hördahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2006), Wu (2004, 2006) , Tinsley (2001, 2005) , and Diebold, Piazzesi, and Rudebusch (2005) .
factors have been suggested that could have induced such changes. For example, a new appreciation of lower macroeconomic volatility or reduced monetary policy uncertainty could alter assessments of the amount of interest rate risk faced by investors. Alternatively, risk aversion may have been reduced as new global investors entered the market. Indeed, this is one interpretation of the explanation suggested by Bernanke (2005) , who argued that "over the past decade a combination of diverse forces has created a signi…cant increase in the global supply of saving-a global saving glut-which helps to explain both the increase in the U.S. current account de…cit and the relatively low level of long-term real interest rates in the world today."In any case, it is likely important to allow for time variation in risk premiums in understanding the recent behavior of the bond rate.
To conduct our analysis of the "conundrum," we use two macro-…nance models of the term structure from the literature. The …rst is a VAR-based model developed by Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2005), denoted BRS, and the second is a New-Keynesian-based model developed by Rudebusch and Wu (2004) , denoted RW. The BRS and RW models share several basic features. First, they are both factor models, so only a small number of sources of variation underlie the pricing of the entire term structure of interest rates. Second, both models impose the standard no-arbitrage restriction from …nance (e.g., Du¢ e and Kan 1996), which ensures that, after accounting for risk, the dynamic evolution of yields over time and across states of nature is consistent with the cross-sectional shape of the yield curve at any one point in time. Finally, both models have important bi-directional linkages between interest rates and macroeconomic variables. However, despite their broad similarities, the BRS and RW models also have technical speci…cations that di¤er in important ways. Because these di¤erences may lead to di¤erent results, we use both models in our analysis in order to provide us with additional perspective and robustness checks on our results.
By extending these models forward from their original samples to the 2004-2005 "conundrum" period, we can determine whether the fall in long-term bond yields over that period was unusual from the viewpoint of the models, as opposed to a continuation of secular declines in long-term interest rates and term premiums that have been taking place since the early 1980s. Our analysis indicates that the level of long-term bond yields in 2004 and 2005 is, in fact, substantially lower than can be explained by either of these models-i.e., that this period does constitute a "conundrum"from a macro-…nance perspective.
Having documented the existence of a conundrum within a rigorous econometric framework, we then turn to possible explanations for the conundrum-factors that necessarily lie outside of the two macro-…nance models we have considered. We examine a number of popular explanations for the conundrum that have been promoted by …nancial analysts and …nd that one of them-lower volatility of long-term Treasury yields-seems to have substantial explanatory power. Interestingly, we …nd no support for the view that foreign o¢ cial purchases of U.S. Treasuries have contributed to the low level of long-term yields, even though this factor is regarded by many …nancial market participants to have been the single most important factor holding down long-term U.S. Treasury yields.
Although there are numerous papers specifying …nance and macro-…nance models of the term structure, our paper …lls a gap in the literature by applying these models to analyze the bond yield "conundrum."The most closely related paper to the present one is Kim and Wright (2005) , who use a pure …nance three-factor model of the term structure to analyze the recent low level of long-term rates, and …nd that a declining term premium is the key factor underlying those low rates. By contrast, we use two macro-…nance models of the term structure and …nd that, within the framework of these models, there is in fact a conundrumthat the model-implied term premiums from our two models are unable to explain the low level of long-term yields observed in [2004] [2005] , despite the fact that the models provide an otherwise excellent …t to the data over the previous 20 years.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the BRS and RW macro-…nance models of the term structure. In Section 3, we discuss the estimation of these models and use them to show that there was a bond yield conundrum in the 2004-2005 period. In Section 4, we investigate what other factors outside of the two models could potentially help to explain the bond yield conundrum episode. Section 5 concludes.
Macro-Finance Models of the Term Structure
To investigate whether and to what extent the low level of U.S. long-term interest rates can be explained by macroeconomic conditions, we will use two macro-…nance models of the term structure, broadly following Ang and Piazzesi (2003) , Piazzesi (2005) , and many others. For analyzing the behavior of the yield curve, these macro-…nance models o¤er a number of advantages over both pure …nance models and pure macroeconomic models.
First, in contrast to standard …nance models of the term structure (e.g., Dai and Singleton, 2000), which relate the yield curve to current and past interest rates, macro-…nance models recognize that interest rates and macroeconomic variables evolve jointly over time, with feedback running from interest rates to macroeconomic variables and also from macroeconomic variables back to interest rates. The latter channel in particular is crucial for the behavior of short-term interest rates, which are determined in many countries by the central bank as a function of the state of macroeconomic variables such as the output gap and in ‡ation. 4 A second advantage of macro-…nance models is that they allow the behavior of risk premiums to depend explicitly on macroeconomic conditions. Standard consumption-based models of asset returns imply that risk premiums are determined by the covariance of an asset's return with the marginal utility of consumption (e.g., Cochrane, 2001) . Moreover, empirical studies of excess returns in bond markets and shorter-duration interest rate derivatives (Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005, and Piazzesi and Swanson, 2004 ) …nd a strong countercyclical relationship between economic activity and excess returns on these securities, particularly during recessions. Macro-…nance models of the term structure explicitly allow for a relationship between risk premiums and macroeconomic conditions. A third advantage of macro-…nance models is that, in contrast to standard macroeconomic models, a substantial component of observed bond yields is allowed to re ‡ect term or risk 4 While a reduced-form relationship between past interest rates and the future behavior of short-term interest rates exists, the Lucas critique suggests that it may be unstable in the face of changing monetary policy. A macro-…nance approach that models monetary policy is arguably less subject to this criticism. Kim and Wright (2005) , who examine the recent conundrum with a standard …nance model, may alleviate this problem by using a fairly short estimation sample (since 1990).
premiums that may vary substantially over time. Indeed, as in a …nance model, macro-…nance models allow term premiums to evolve according to the estimated dynamics of the model in a way that is consistent with an absence of arbitrage opportunities in …nancial markets. Thus, while macro-…nance models of the term structure retain the appealing macroeconometric features of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model or a vector autoregression (VAR), they do not impose the expectations hypothesis and can allow for a rich behavior of term premiums.
To explore the recent behavior of long-term bond rates, we use two macro-…nance models from the literature, the VAR-based model developed in Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2005) and the more structural New Keynesian-based model developed in Rudebusch and Wu (2004) . We discuss each in turn.
Bernanke-Reinhart-Sack Model
The BRS model uses …ve observable macroeconomic variables, speci…ed below, as factors with which to …t the yield curve. The dynamics of the …ve factors are governed by a VAR with four lags, which can be stacked into the 20-element vector X t and described by a VAR (1) model:
where the stochastic shocks " t are i.i.d. over time and have a standard normal distribution.
Consistent with the companion form speci…cation in (1), only the uppermost blocks of and are nontrivial. For simplicity, the prices of risk in the model, speci…ed below, are assumed to load only on the …ve current values of the macroeconomic variables (i.e., the top …ve elements of X t ).
Following Du¢ e and Kan (1996), Dai and Singleton (2000) , and Ang and Piazzesi (2003) , among others, we assume that the stochastic discount factor with which bonds in the model are priced is conditionally log-normal with functional form:
where t is a 20-dimensional vector of market prices of risk associated with the innovations to the VAR, " t . Of course, because only the …rst …ve elements of " t are nonzero, we assume that only the …rst …ve elements of t are nonzero, which is essentially a normalization. Following the papers cited above, the market prices of risk t are assumed to be a¢ ne functions of the state variables of the economy:
where 0 is a 20-dimensional vector of constants and 1 is a 20-by-20 matrix of risk price factor loadings on the state variables X t . As mentioned above, we assume for simplicity that the prices of risk depend only on the current values of the variables in X t , thus only the upper-left 5-by-5 block of 1 is nonzero.
Bonds in the model are priced according to the standard relationship with the stochastic pricing kernel:
where P n t denotes the price of an n-period zero-coupon bond at date t. Let y n t denote the corresponding continuously-compounded yield on the same zero-coupon bond. Then it follows from equations (1)-(4) that:
where a 0 = 0, b 0 = 0, and a n (a scalar) and b n (a 5-by-1 vector) are computed recursively according to:
and where 0 (a scalar) and 1 (a 5-by-1 vector) describe the one-period interest rate as a function of the state of the economy: y
Rudebusch-Wu Model
The RW model shares many features with the BRS model, since both models price bonds using an a¢ ne no-arbitrage framework. Thus, for expositional simplicity and to conserve notation, when concepts in the two models are the same, we will take the corresponding variable name from the BRS model exposition above and recycle it in the description of the RW model below (even though the number of factors, and hence the number of dimensions, in the two models are di¤erent). Note that, despite the similarity in the bond-pricing framework, the dynamics of the underlying macroeconomic factors in the RW model di¤er in important ways from BRS, with RW using a more structural New Keynesian macroeconomic framework to model these dynamic relationships as opposed to a VAR.
Bond pricing in the RW model is governed by the same a¢ ne no-arbitrage framework in (2)-(6) described above. However, in contrast to the BRS model, the RW model de…nes the one-period interest rate to be a sum of two latent factors, L t and S t :
where L t can be thought of as the "level" of the yield curve and S t as (the negative of) the yield curve "slope,"as discussed in Rudebusch and Wu (2004) . 6 Intuitively, the Federal
Reserve sets the one-period nominal interest rate in the model as the sum of a constant steady-state real interest rate ( 0 ), a time-varying medium-to long-term in ‡ation rate (L t ), and a cyclically responsive component S t that is given by:
where y t is the output gap and t the in ‡ation rate. Equation (8) is essentially a Taylor (1993) rule for the short-term rate i t with both inertia (through the lag S t 1 ) and serially correlated errors (as described by Rudebusch 2002b).
The dynamics of L t are given by:
which says that the medium-term in ‡ation goal is persistent but may depend also on the recent behavior of short-term in ‡ation, as suggested by the evidence in Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) .
The latent factors L t and S t are jointly determined with the macroeconomic variables y t and t by a New Keynesian-type model (adjusted to apply to monthly data):
That is, in ‡ation responds to the private sector's expectation of the medium-term in ‡ation goal (L t ), two lags of in ‡ation, and the output gap; the output gap, in turn, responds to the expected future output gap, two lags of the output gap, and a real interest rate. Equations (11) and (12) are "hybrid" New Keynesian equations in the sense that the expectational coe¢ cients and y are allowed to be less than unity when the model is …tted to the data.
3 Is There a Bond Yield "Conundrum"?
To investigate whether the recent low level of U.S. long-term bond yields is a conundrum from a macro-…nance perspective, we use the BRS and RW models to …t the recent macroeconomic and interest rate data and examine the two model predictions for long-term bond yields.
Model Estimates

BRS Model Estimates
Our original inclination was to use the "o¤-the-shelf" BRS model parameter estimates for our analysis. However, after examining the data and model estimation code (kindly supplied by Brian Sack) and …ne-tuning the nonlinear optimization procedure, we were able to obtain a better …t to the data than BRS report in their paper, with root-mean-squared errors that were about half as large even over the identical sample. Thus, we do not use the parameter values as estimated by BRS, since we have found that the model can …t the data better than originally reported. Moreover, because we are reestimating the parameters of the model, we take the opportunity to extend the BRS estimation period through the end of 2005, which has the added advantage of giving the model the best possible chance of …tting the recent low "conundrum" level of bond yields by …tting them in rather than out of the sample. In every other respect, however, we have followed BRS in their analysis.
We estimate the BRS model on monthly macroeconomic and bond yield data over the period from January 1984 to December 2005. 7 Ideally, one would like to perform the esti- Although this technical issue can be addressed by estimating the model in such a way as to ensure consistency between the model and survey forecasts to the greatest extent possible (see Swanson, 2006) , doing so would require moving away from standard VAR estimation procedures, which is beyond the scope of the present paper. Thus, we follow BRS and simply estimate a VAR on all …ve of the macroeconomic time series above, and leave the issue of consistency between model-based forecasts and forecast data to subsequent work.
Although the BRS model (and also the RW model) is linear in the state variables, the model's predictions for bond yields are highly nonlinear in the parameters (as are the impulse response functions in a VAR, for example). 10 Estimation of the bond-pricing implications of the model is thus highly nonlinear and can be tricky in practice, with a great many local minima. (Indeed, as noted above, by experimenting and exploring the parameter space, we were able to obtain a better …t to the data than BRS report in their paper.) To reduce the number of model parameters that must be estimated nonlinearly, we follow Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006) Our results from estimating the BRS model are reported in Tables 1, 2 , and 3. The VAR parameter estimates in Table 1 show that each variable in the VAR has a coe¢ cient near unity on its own …rst lag, with smaller coe¢ cients on longer lags of itself and on lags of other variables. The sum of the coe¢ cients on each variable's own lags is near unity. For the federal funds rate, the coe¢ cients suggest a hump-shaped impulse response and autocorrelation functions, but the other variables exhibit impulse response and autocorrelation functions 10 Indeed, to compute the model-implied 10-year yield, we must project the monthly VAR and prices of risk forward 120 months. Thus, when …tting the model to the data, we are essentially trying to minimize a 120th-degree polynomial. 11 The …nance and macro-…nance literatures typically use end-of-month yield data rather than monthaverage yields. However, the model is linear in the state variables, so it is completely consistent to view the model's equations as holding for the month-average data as well as the daily data and the end-of-month data. Moreover, our macro data are typically monthly averages, so using month-average yields is arguably more consistent with the macro data.
that are closer to a geometric decay.
The BRS model's estimated risk factor loadings are reported in Table 2 . Although these estimated loadings show the greatest coe¢ cients on the Blue Chip in ‡ation expectations variable, that variable also has a relatively lower variance, as can be seen in Table 1 , so the net e¤ect on bond prices is not as great as the factor loadings would suggest by themselves.
12 Table 3 reports the quality of the model's …t, in terms of root-mean-squared errors (RMSEs) for the eight points on the yield curve that the model was estimated against. Except at the shortest horizons, these root-mean-squared errors are less than half as large as those reported by BRS for their sample period. This di¤erence is not simply due to the sample period: even when we restrict our sample to the one used by BRS, we are able to obtain RMSEs less than half as large by experimenting and exploring the parameter space.
RW Model Estimates
For the RW model, we take the original parameter values as estimated by Rudebusch and Wu (2004) from January 1988 to December 2000 using monthly data. In that estimation, the in ‡ation rate was measured by the year-on-year change in the overall PCE de ‡ator, the output gap was measured by capacity utilization, and interest rates were end-of-month data on …ve U.S. Treasury zero-coupon yields that have maturities of 1, 3, 12, 36, and 60 months (yields are unsmoothed Fama-Bliss data expressed at an annual rate in percent).
Since there are two underlying latent factors but …ve observable yields, RW follow the usual strategy and assume that the 3-, 12-, and 36-month yields are measured with i:i:d:
error, as in Ang and Piazzesi (2003) . (Note that this implies that, for a given set of parameter values, the latent factors L t and S t can be backed out perfectly from the observed 1-month and 60-month bond yields.) The estimated size of the measurement error that is required to …t the other yields is a common metric for the quality of the model's …t. Also note that the 10-year rate is not used in the estimation, so examining the recent episode of low bond rates is an out-of-sample exercise in terms of both the estimation sample and bond maturity.
In contrast to the BRS model, all of the parameters of the RW model are estimated in a single step by maximum likelihood. Table 4 reports the RW model parameter estimates, from Rudebusch and Wu (2004) . First, consider the dynamics of the factors. The factor L t is very persistent, with a L estimate of 0.989, which implies a small but signi…cant weight on actual in ‡ation. The dynamics of S t are also very persistent, but this persistence does not come from partial adjustment since the S estimate is a minuscule 0.026. Instead, S t responds with only a very short lag to output and in ‡ation shocks.
The persistence in S t re ‡ects the fact that the Fed adjusts the short rate promptly to various determinants-output, in ‡ation, and other in ‡uences in the residual u t -that are themselves quite persistent (e.g., u = 0:975). 13 The monetary policy interpretation of the slope factor is supported by the values of the estimated in ‡ation and output response coe¢ cients, g and g y , which are 1.25 and 0.20, respectively. These estimates are similar to the usual single-equation estimates of the Taylor rule during this sample period (e.g.,
Rudebusch 2002b).
The estimated parameters describing the in ‡ation dynamics also appear reasonable.
14
In particular, the estimated weight on explicit forward-looking expectations in determining in ‡ation, , is 0.074. Since this estimate is based on monthly data, with time aggregation, it implies a weight of about 0.21 on the interim in ‡ation objective at a quarterly frequency. This estimate appears consistent with many earlier estimates obtained using a variety of di¤erent methods and speci…cations. For example, using survey data on expectations, Rudebusch (2002a) obtains a broadly comparable estimate of 0.29, which is in the middle of the range of estimates in the literature. However, by using the yield curve to extract in ‡ation expectations, our estimates bring new information to bear on this important macroeconomic 13 Thus, our estimate of S decisively dismisses the interest rate smoothing or monetary policy inertia interpretation of the persistence in the short rate.
14 After taking into account time aggregation and the higher cyclical variability of capacity utilization compared with the output gap, the elasticity of in ‡ation with respect to output ( y = 0:014) appears about half the size of estimates that use the entire postwar sample of quarterly data, for example, Rudebusch 15 The interest rate sensitivity of output ( r = 0:089), after taking into account the time aggregation and the use of capacity utilization rather than the output gap, appears broadly in line with estimates that use the entire postwar sample of quarterly data.
Macro-Finance Model Analysis of the 10-year Treasury Yield
Before analyzing the recent episode of bond yields within the framework of the macro-…nance models above, it may be useful to summarize the salient di¤erences between the two models. (except for the no-arbitrage assumption), while the RW model is more tightly parameterized with identi…able, explicitly forward-looking aggregate demand, aggregate supply, and policy rule equations. As an indication of the di¤erences in parameterization, the BRS model has 100 parameters describing the factor dynamics and 25 risk-pricing parameters, excluding constants, while the RW model has 13 and 4, respectively. Again, we view these di¤erences between the two models as useful to the extent they can illuminate the robustness of our results.
To start our analysis, we plot the 10-year zero-coupon U.S. Treasury yield together with the decomposition of that yield into its constituent components, as implied by the BRS and RW macro-…nance models, in Figures 1 and 2 , respectively. We focus on the 10-year yield in particular because that yield was the benchmark for long-term interest rates in the U.S. over the period of interest and because discussions of the long-term bond yield "conundrum"by policymakers and in the popular press have often focused on the 10-year U.S. Treasury in particular.
In the top panel of Figure 1 , we plot the zero-coupon U.S. Treasury yield from 1984 through 2005 together with the BRS model decomposition of that yield. The BRS modelimplied risk-neutral rate (the blue line) is the model's estimated yield on a riskless 10-year zero-coupon bond at each date t in a hypothetical world in which the prices of risk t are always equal to zero and the state variables of the economy are governed by the VAR in Table 1 . The BRS model-implied 10-year Treasury yield (the orange dashed line in Figure 1) is the model's estimated value of the same 10-year zero-coupon bond when the prices of risk t are no longer zero, but are instead the estimated a¢ ne function of the macroeconomic variables given in Table 2 . The BRS model-implied term premium (the red line) is the di¤erence between the orange dashed line and the blue line, and can be interpreted as the model's estimate of the risk or term premium on the 10-year zero-coupon bond at each date t. Finally, the BRS model does not match the data perfectly, so the model's residuals-the di¤erence between the model predictions (the orange dashed line) and the data (the black line)-are graphed in the bottom panel of Figure 1 .
As can be seen in the top panel of Figure 1 , the close …t of the BRS model to the data is striking. Not only does the model capture the general downward trend in the 10-year yield over this period, but even the high-frequency swings in this yield in the late 1980s and mid-1990s are matched extremely well. The …t is even more remarkable in light of the fact that the model was not optimized to …t the 10-year yield, but rather placed equal weight on eight maturities all along the term structure. According to the model, both the risk-neutral 10-year yield and the term premium have fallen over our sample, with the fall in the term premium being somewhat more important. According to the model, the risk-neutral yield has fallen about 250 bp over this period while the term premium has fallen about 350 bp, and the term premium has fallen from about one-half of the total 10-year U.S. Treasury yield in the 1980s to about one-third of that yield more recently.
However, despite the model's excellent …t to the data overall, the recent period of low In Figure 2 , we present the analogous pair of graphs for the 10-year bond yield decomposition implied by the RW model. Again, the …t of the model to the data is excellent, and this is all the more remarkable given that the RW model was not optimized to …t the 10-year yield at all-indeed, RW in their paper chose the 5-year yield as the longest maturity in the estimation.
A striking observation from Figures 1 and 2 is that, although both the RW and BRS macro-…nance models produce very high quality forecasts of the 10-year Treasury yield, the 2 models'implied decomposition of that yield into expected short rate and term premium components is very di¤erent. In the RW model, the term premium is relatively constant over Why is the decomposition implied by the two models so di¤erent? Recall that the BRS model is estimated in two stages, with the macroeconomic VAR estimated …rst. The smoothly downward-trending risk-neutral rate in the BRS model is essentially a projection of the future path of short rates based on the VAR, so the VAR in the BRS model is implying a smoother path for the risk-neutral 10-year yield than is the case for the actual 10-year yield in the data. By contrast, in the RW model, the future path of short-term interest rates is a¤ected greatly by the in ‡ation "level" factor L t . Since L t can vary at high frequency in response to exogenous shocks to itself and to in ‡ation, the RW model's speci…cation allows these shocks to pass essentially directly through to the risk-neutral 10-year yield, leading to signi…cant high-frequency variation in that variable.
The high-frequency variation in the risk-neutral 10-year yield that is allowed for (but not assumed) by the RW model is arguably one of its strengths-indeed, Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) found signi…cant systematic variation in far-ahead forward nominal interest rates in response to macroeconomic news in a way that suggested changes in in ‡ation expectations rather than changes in term premiums. Similarly, Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) found that statistical models that allow for a "moving endpoint" are able to …t interest rate and in ‡ation time series much better than standard stationary or di¤erence-stationary VARs. A weakness of the BRS model and many other macroeconomic models, according to both of these papers, is that those models assume long-run features of the economy, such as the steady-state real interest rate and rate of in ‡ation, are too well-anchored in response to shocks. The RW model relaxes that restriction to a much greater extent than does the BRS model. 16 
Factors That May Underlie the Conundrum
According to the BRS and RW macro-…nance models, the recent behavior of long-term interest rates does present us with something of a conundrum. In this section, we investigate whether there are any additional factors that lie outside of the two models that could potentially explain this episode of unusually low long-term bond yields. One could of course search for correlations between our macro-…nance model residuals and nonlinear functions of the variables that are already included in the model, such as the output gap, in ‡ation, and the federal funds rate. We focus instead on searching for variables outside of the models because we do not have particularly strong priors that nonlinearities in the above variables have played an important role in the U.S. long-term Treasury market recently, while there are many plausible candidate variables that have been omitted from the model (a number of which have been emphasized in the …nancial press).
We …rst brie ‡y review various explanations for the conundrum that have been discussed in the literature, and then provide some empirical analysis based on the estimated macro…nance models in order to help assess the importance of the various factors.
Popular Explanations for Low Long-Term Bond Yields
A large number of possible candidate explanations for low bond yields have been discussed by …nancial analysts. A simple means to summarize this set of explanations (and to some extent limit consideration to the most important ones) is to examine a survey of bond traders, hedge fund managers, and business economists conducted by the …rm Macroeconomic Advisers.
Their survey was taken in early March 2005 and asked participants to provide their views on the importance of various factors that might explain the low level of the 10-year Treasury yield. Table 5 displays the seven most important factors that were identi…ed as holding down bond yields as well as a rough estimate of how much each factor was judged by survey respondents to have reduced the bond yield (in basis points). 17 The largest e¤ect by far was attributed to increased demand for U.S. longer-term securities from foreign central banks.
Indeed, on average, the survey respondents thought that purchases by foreign central banks had lowered U.S. long-term rates by 21 bp. 18 After foreign o¢ cial purchases of U.S. Treasuries, survey respondents assigned about equal importance to the other factors in Table 5 , with each factor accounting for 7 to 11 bp of lower long-term rates. For example, an increased demand for long bonds in light of the greater likelihood of future corporate pension fund reform in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere was assigned an importance of about 11 bp. Such reforms would likely encourage pension funds to better match the duration of their assets to their liabilities, 17 Several other factors (such as increased demand by holders of mortgage-backed securities) were often noted in the survey but were assessed to have an e¤ect of only a few basis points and are excluded from the table. 18 In the academic literature, Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2005) and Warnock and Warnock (2005) have also stressed the importance of the recent increases in foreign central bank purchases, especially by East Asian countries. Wu (2005) , however, notes that …nding signi…cant e¤ects of such purchases on U.S. Treasury yields is sensitive to the sample period and can be quite elusive.
which is expected to boost demand for long-term bonds. 19 Although this factor has been widely cited (e.g., Bank for International Settlements 2005), it is di¢ cult to quantify, and we do not include it in our empirical analysis below.
Similarly, we do not quantify two factors that appear to relate to shifts in investor appetite for risk. These include the factor, "reaching for yield," which is shorthand for the view that high levels of liquidity had encouraged investors to reduce their aversion to risk (perhaps irrationally in an almost bubble-like manner). Also, a closely related factor is the view that excess global saving-the global saving glut hypothesis of Bernanke noted in the introduction-stemming perhaps from less home bias among foreign investors or rapid economic growth in countries with high saving rates, had boosted foreign demand for bonds generally (e.g., Warnock and Warnock 2005).
We do however employ some proxies that try to measure a possible decrease in the amount of risk that investors may feel they face. Indeed, the Macroeconomic Advisers survey respondents pointed to lower uncertainty as an important factor in three of their responses: minimal in ‡ation risk, greater transparency of the Fed (which presumably would translate into lower short-term interest rate uncertainty), and low economic growth volatility.
Taken together, these three factors suggest a very important role for reduced macroeconomic uncertainty in reducing the long-term bond rate.
An Empirical Assessment of Various Explanations
To examine some popular explanations for low long-term bond yields, we consider six variables excluded from the BRS and RW macro-…nance models: three measures of …nancial market volatility, two measures of macroeconomic volatility, and one measure of international capital ‡ows. For …nancial market volatility, we use the Merrill-Lynch MOVE Index to measure the implied volatility in the longer-term U.S. Treasury market; 20 we use the im- 19 These demands for duration would, of course, reach out much longer than a 10-year horizon, and indeed in 2005 there was strong demand for the revived 30-year U.S. Treasury bond, for a newly launched French 50-year bond issue, and for a 50-year British in ‡ation-indexed bond. 20 The Merill Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE) Index reports the average implied volatility across a wide range of outstanding options on the 2-year, 5-year, 10-year, and 30-year U.S. Treasury securities (with plied volatility from eurodollar options to measure uncertainty about the near-term path of monetary policy; 21 and we use the VIX measure of implied volatility from options on the S&P 500 index to measure uncertainty in the stock market. For macroeconomic uncertainty, we proxy for output uncertainty by using the eight-quarter trailing standard deviation of the growth rate of real GDP, interpolating between the resulting quarterly volatility measure to get a monthly series, and we proxy for in ‡ation uncertainty by using the 24-month trailing standard deviation of core PCE de ‡ator in ‡ation. Finally, we proxy for foreign government and foreign central bank purchases of U.S. Treasury securities by using the 12-month change in the custodial holdings by the New York Fed for all foreign o¢ cial institutions (and we normalize this series by the total stock of U.S. Treasury debt in the hands of the public).
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All of these series are natural candidates for omitted variables that could be impacting the level of long-term U.S. Treasury yields. For example, reduced volatility in long-term bond markets would tend to make those securities more attractive relative to other assets and drive long-term bond yields down, all else equal. Conversely, a reduced degree of uncertainty about stock returns would tend to drive the prices of stocks up and might require longterm interest rates to rise in order to keep …xed-income securities attractive by comparison.
Reduced uncertainty about the future path of monetary policy may lower the riskiness of holding long-term bonds leading to a fall in long-term yields. Reduced uncertainty about in ‡ation may make …xed income securities of all maturities more attractive, and reduced uncertainty about output may lower the risk premium and raise the prices of all risky assets in general. Finally, inelastic demand by foreign central banks and governments for long-term a total weight of 40 percent on the 10-year Treasury and total weights of 20 percent each on the other maturities). Note that the options underlying the MOVE Index have expiration dates of approximately one month; thus, the MOVE index measures the implied volatility of long-term yields over a relatively short horizon. Such short-term uncertainty about long-maturity yields may be related but is not the same as uncertainty about the path of short-term interest rates in the distant future. 21 Speci…cally, we use the closest to at-the-money eurodollar option with expiration in six months'time to measure the implied volatility for the 90-day eurodollar rate. 22 The idea that the available quantity of long-term U.S. Treasury securities matters for long-term yields suggests that we should also look at total issuance of marketable U.S. Treasury securities by the U.S. government as well as the purchases of those securities by foreign governments. In preliminary results not reported here, we do …nd evidence that greater total issuance of marketable U.S. Treasuries does lead to higher long-term interest rates (Bikbov and Chernov, 2006 , also …nd a correlation between total issuance of U.S. Treasuries and their macro-…nance model residuals). Even when we include total issuance as an explanatory variable in our regressions below, however, we …nd little evidence that foreign o¢ cial purchases have had a signi…cant impact on long-term Treasury yields. U.S. Treasury securities has often been cited in the popular press (and in Warnock-Warnock, 2005 ) as a reason why yields on those securities have been so low recently.
Graphs of each of these six variables over the 1984-2005 sample are presented in Figure   3 (note that not all of the above series, particularly the implied volatility series for …nancial market data, are available before about 1989). It is immediately clear from the …gure that many of these series show a marked dip in the last few years-thus, as readers of the …nancial press are well aware, there is no shortage of possible explanations for the conundrum! In Table 6 , we conduct a preliminary statistical analysis of the importance of these variables by regressing the residuals from the BRS model and the RW model on each of the six independent variables described above, in a set of univariate regressions. A signi…cant correlation between one of these variables and the models'residuals would suggest that that variable is perhaps an important determinant of long-term U.S. Treasury yields that has not been captured by the model. 23 As can be seen in Table 6 , and as was evident in Figure 3 , many of the variables above are correlated with the models' residuals. Indeed, …ve of the six variables are statistically signi…cant at the 10 percent level for at least one of the two models'residuals. Two of the six variables-implied volatility on long-term Treasuries and GDP volatility-are statistically signi…cant at the 5 percent level or better for both models'residuals. Interestingly, foreign o¢ cial purchases of U.S. Treasuries-the variable that is most emphasized by the …nancial press and by the Macroeconomic Advisers survey respondents-is the only one of the six variables that is not signi…cant at even the 10 percent level for at least one of the two sets of model residuals (and has a positive sign, rather than the negative correlation hypothesized by the press). This result is very similar to that of Wu (2005) , who …nds that, after controlling for macroeconomic determinants of bond yields, the correlation between foreign o¢ cial 23 The purpose of these regressions is to help identify which variables might potentially be the most important to incorporate into the models going forward. Of course, just because a variable is signi…cantly contemporaneously correlated with our macro-…nance model residuals does not necessarily imply that it will remain signi…cant when fully incorporated into a macro-…nance framework, although we interpret a strong contemporaneous correlation as suggestive that it will be. Also, there is no guarantee that our macro-…nance model residuals are orthogonal even to the variables included in the models because of the overidentifying restrictions those models impose. We interpret the regression results under the assumption that the overidentifying model restrictions are correct, although again, we consider both models in order to provide some assurance of robustness. purchases and bond yields is signi…cantly positive between 1987 and 2000, and negative only since 2002. Thus, the correlation that has been emphasized so much by the …nancial press is not one that has been consistent over recent history.
A primary problem with Table 6 , of course, is that many of the variables show declines in 2004 and 2005, and thus univariate regression results may be double-counting the explanatory power of the variables for the conundrum. Table 7 The multivariate regression results in Table 7 are, for the most part, consistent with the univariate regression results in Table 6 . The most signi…cant and robust explanatory variable is the implied volatility on longer-term Treasuries. Macroeconomic volatility also seems to play a statistically signi…cant role, with core PCE in ‡ation volatility signi…cant at the 5 percent level for both models'residuals, and GDP growth volatility signi…cant for the BRS model residuals. The signs of these coe¢ cients are also what one would typically expect, with lower implied volatility on Treasuries and lower realized volatility of output and in ‡ation all being correlated with lower yields on long-term Treasury securities. Again, foreign o¢ cial purchases is the only variable that is not statistically signi…cant at the 10 percent level for at least one of the two models'residuals, and continues to have a positive sign.
Decomposition of the Bond Yield Conundrum
How much of the bond yield conundrum can these additional variables explain? In Table 8 Table 8 were not statistically signi…cant in the previous section and account for relatively small changes in yields over the conundrum period.
As can be seen in the last line of Table 8 , even the six omitted variables studied in the previous section can explain only about one-fourth to, at most, one-half of the BRS and RW model residuals. Thus, we have by no means found the missing link that explains the bond yield conundrum, but we have found evidence that reductions in longer-term Treasury volatility probably have played an important role, and that foreign o¢ cial purchases of U.S.
Treasuries probably have not.
Conclusions
We draw a number of conclusions from the above analysis. First, the low level of long-term bond yields in the U.S. during the 2004-2005 period does appear to be a conundrum when viewed through a macro-…nance lens. Speci…cally, neither of the two macro-…nance empirical models we consider is able to explain the recent low level of, or the fall in, long-term bond yields. This …nding is remarkabe given that both models …t the earlier long-term yield data quite well. Therefore, the conundrum can likely only be explained with variables that lie outside of our baseline macro-…nance models. Of the six such variables that we consider, it is declines in the (short-run implied) volatility of long-term Treasury yields that seem to have played the most important role. Even so, at best, almost two-thirds of the conundrum remains unexplained.
Interestingly, we …nd that the explanation for the conundrum emphasized by …nancial market participants-namely, large-scale purchases of long-term Treasuries by foreign central banks-has essentially no explanatory power for the conundrum episode. This discrepancy may re ‡ect a di¤erence between unconditional and conditional correlations. In particular, long-term Treasury yields have been declining steadily over time, and foreign o¢ cial holdings and purchases of U.S. Treasuries have been rising steadily; thus, the unconditional correlation suggests a substantial negative e¤ect. In contrast, a macro-…nance econometric framework attributes the downward trend in long-term yields largely to declining current and future projected levels of in ‡ation. After controlling for such factors, the residuals from our two baseline macro-…nance models have no signi…cant correlation with foreign o¢ cial purchases of U.S. Treasuries.
Of course, this leaves us with about two-thirds of the bond yield conundrum yet to be explained, to say nothing of the similar or perhaps even more extreme behavior of long-term yields in other countries, such as Germany and Japan. The resolution of these "conundrum" epsiodes, in the U.S. and abroad, presents a rich frontier for future research. 
